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A GENERAL SURVEY
OF THE
AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE
CAIRO
26 DECEMBER 1957 – 1 JANUARY 1958

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October 1958

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A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE CONFERENCE

I. INTRODUCTION

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference which convened in Cairo on 26 December 1957 brought together a reported 476 delegates from 43 countries of Asia and Africa, as well as observers from Europe and Latin America. Most of these "observers" represented Communist international front organizations. Ostensibly dedicated to the idea of bringing together African and Asian peoples to provide coordinated support for colonial struggles for independence, for peaceful economic development, and for cultural growth, the gathering mainly served the interests of Soviet Communism, by endorsing programs long carried out by the traditional Communist international fronts, by accepting the USSR as an Asian state, and by providing a basis, in its resolutions, for future Communist propaganda and agitational activity throughout Africa and Asia.

The primary Communist objectives at the Conference were to enlist Afro-Asian support for the peace campaign, to generate pressure for adoption by the independent states in the area of the Soviet/Communist methods of "building socialism", to promote economic struggle between the West and the Afro-Asian world, and to pave the way for the gradual economic integration of the Asian and Near Eastern nations with the Soviet bloc.

The Conference cannot be considered a complete success from the point of view of any of the elements involved in it.* Whatever the advantages the USSR and national Communist parties may be able to derive from its resolutions, the alienation of a significant number of the Free World delegates, the disappointing of others who went to the Conference with high hopes, and the exposure of Communist aims and methods which

*For Communist gains from the Conference, however, see Section XI.

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took place at the Conference--all constitute potential if not actual setbacks for the Communist cause. There is evidence of some polarization among Conference delegates--some have moved toward closer identification with the Soviet bloc, while others have retreated from their erstwhile uncritical endorsement of the Communist's concept of peaceful coexistence.

However, as in other such instances involving the traditional international fronts, the failure of dissenting and opposition forces to take conclusive steps to counter Communist initiatives gives the International Communist Movement the time and opportunity to adjust to changed conditions, and exploit to the full the tactical advantages it has undoubtedly gained.

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II. THE BASIS FOR THE CONFERENCE

A prime objective of Communist strategy since the end of 1953 has been to win over to the "Socialist bloc" the nations and peoples of Africa and Asia. Confronted with the accumulated distrust, resentment, and hatred engendered by the destructive, deceptive, and often violent campaigns waged by virtually all the Communist parties of the area from 1946 until at least 1952, the new Communist campaign to gain acceptance and organize unity of action against the West was begun with difficulty. Steps such as the Moscow Economic Conference of 1952 were taken by the USSR even prior to the death of Stalin, but it was not until the end of 1953 that a coherent program began to emerge.

The Soviet Union then began its efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The Cominform, under Soviet control, conveyed the essentials of the policy to the Communist parties of the Free World. Communist China, disengaged from its unsuccessful aggressive war in Korea, began its conciliatory campaign to gain acceptance among the peoples of Asia. The World Peace Council, in which the Communist parties of the bloc combined with national front groups sponsored by the Communist parties of the Free World, launched its campaign for the lessening of international tensions. The first stage of this campaign in Asia culminated in April 1955 with the Conference for the Lessening of International Tensions held in New Delhi and, one week later, with the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Here Communist China was afforded an opportunity by a group of independent Asian states to demonstrate its ability to act as a responsible state, willing to make and honor solemn commitments in its relations with other states. It subscribed there to the now well-known "Bandung principles", foremost among which was a solemn commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states.

But such interference was already in progress and continued thereafter without visible interruption. National

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Communist parties remained responsive to directions from Moscow and Peiping, and the traditional international Communist fronts continued their attempts on the national scene to create and organize popular pressure for acceptance of Communist policies.

A new instrument, the Asian Solidarity Committee, emerged from the New Delhi Conference. At about the same time in the Near East a parallel effort resulted in the convening of the second Arab People's Conference. Both of these gatherings were designed to serve as vehicles for Communist unity campaigns in the respective regions, but in the two years that followed neither venture registered any politically significant gain. The de-Stalinization and liberalization campaigns within the Soviet bloc failed to dispel the distrust of these Communist-inspired and dominated groups, and until the end of 1956, neither had succeeded in finding a theme with sufficient attraction to overcome this distrust.

But in December 1956 the decision apparently was made to exploit the Middle East crisis as the basis for a merger of both these unity campaigns. The attention which had previously been directed--without visible success--at enlisting the cooperation of the South Asian countries was now shifted to the Arab countries. With the endorsement by Egypt in January 1957 of the proposal that an Afro-Asian people's conference be held in Cairo, the stage appeared set for another step forward. But again the movement lost momentum. For six months no concrete steps were taken to organize the projected conference. No date was set, no preparatory body was organized, no local campaigns to organize delegations or generate interest in the gathering took place.

However, the small group of persons who had taken the earlier initiatives in the campaign continued to work diligently. Plans and preparations were made for exploiting the Conference once it was organized. Reliable cadres and easily manipulated Communist sympathizers already active in the Peace Movement and other fronts could be brought together with comparative ease. But again it appeared that

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the indispensable attractive theme which could invoke widespread interest and participation had not been found.

Eventually it was in the creation of the European Common Market in March 1957 and the announcement of plans for a major European program of economic development in Africa, that the organizers recognized their opportunity. For more than a year authoritative Communist publications such as the CPSU theoretical journal, Kommunist, had been stating that the main future efforts in the anti-imperialist struggle were to be centered in the economic field; and Marxist politico-economic doctrine was peculiarly suited to sustain such a campaign. The Soviet bloc, national Communist parties, and international fronts promptly attacked these Eurafrican plans as part of their anti-colonial agitation, alleging among other things that the plans involved

a. a decision by the Western states to reduce their economic dependence upon, and commitment in, the independent countries of the Near East and Africa;

b. a Western determination to use punitive economic measures instead of armed aggression against those countries which persisted in adhering to neutralist policies and in expanding their relationships with the Socialist bloc;

c. a Western decision to strengthen their hold over the resources and peoples of colonial Africa, to compensate for their losses elsewhere.

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Again, as was the case with the Communist reaction to the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, the UN action in Korea, the European Defense Community, etc., constructive and defensive measures taken by Free World nations in response to aggressive Soviet bloc initiatives were maligned, denounced--and then promptly adapted to serve Communist ends.

It now appears that the most significant factors exploited to generate maximum participation by responsible citizens of the independent countries of Afro-Asia in the Solidarity Conference in Cairo were

a. the fears generated by Communist-inspired interpretations of the significance of the Common Market and Eurafrican plans, and

b. the hopes and interest connected with proposals for the creation of an Afro-Asian common market, development fund, combined marketing systems, etc. In this regard it was anticipated and inferred--although never authoritatively stated--that participating countries of the Soviet bloc would be major contributors of aid, profitable trading partners, and willing participants in equitable multilateral commerce. The arguments advanced in support of the European programs were, by analogy, equally attractive when transferred to an Afro-Asian context.

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With such participation provided for, the appeal to individuals from the colonial territories of Africa was virtually assured of some success. These groups, together with dissident opposition elements from a number of the Middle Eastern states, made up the bulk of the participation at Cairo.

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III. ORGANIZING THE CONFERENCE

Once the chances for winning non-Communist participation in the Conference looked promising, preparatory work began. An Egyptian Committee was set up under the leadership of Anwar Sadat. This group, working closely with the Egyptian Government, issued the formal invitations to a preliminary meeting to organize the Conference. At this meeting a preparatory committee was set up, an agenda was drafted, financial arrangements for handling the costs of the actual Conference were made, and formal invitations were sent out asking that national delegations be organized.

But the preparatory meeting in fact did little more than approve the activities and proposals of the original organizers and vest them with authority to act in the name of a multinational body. Attempts by some participants--particularly the Turkish delegate--to take up substantive questions at the preparatory meeting were rapidly defeated. Once the preparatory meeting was over, the main responsibility for preparations fell upon the original organizers. The Asian Solidarity Committee figures took primary responsibility for organizing in the Soviet bloc and in South Asia, while the Egyptian group took on the task of organizing in Africa and the Arab World.

Three types of local effort were noted. First, in India, Japan, Burma, and the Bloc the national Asian Solidarity Committees approached selected individuals and receptive groups, including in most instances political parties in opposition to the existing governments or at least to some policies being carried out by those governments. Second, in a number of instances contact was established with national affiliates of the World Peace Movement, which were asked to organize national preparatory groups. This type of effort was noted in colonial territories and also to some extent in the cases of Iraq and Jordan. Third, where no Peace Partisan groups existed, travelling representatives of the Egyptian body made personal contacts, advised and assisted by the Egyptian Government, with national governments or local personalities, requesting that they undertake the organizing task.

In a number of instances Peace Partisan groups cut back their organizing initiatives when it became apparent that non-Communist parties and personalities had accepted the Egyptian proposals. In

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some instances they withdrew entirely from the organizing work when they realized that they might alienate other interested parties who were suspicious of Communist motives. In others, they supported or joined with the organizers in selecting delegations. In Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan there were disagreements over the composition of the delegations; but in every case a settlement was achieved. In many instances participation was assured only when the Egyptian representatives made the concession demanded by those non-Communists whose cooperation they sought.

In the course of this effort, one of the more interesting developments was the placing of a significant new topic on the agenda--the question of the European Common Market. There is no evidence that this addition--which was first revealed by one of the travelling Egyptian representatives before the Conference--had been approved in advance by the full preparatory committee.

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IV. THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

When the Conference convened, the program called for

a. An initial series of plenary sessions, at which leaders of national delegations were to deliver addresses, and conference procedure was to be agreed upon.

b. The organization of commissions to deal with each major section of the agenda. It was apparently originally intended that the commission work would involve first a series of speeches; then a presentation of a draft report and recommendations by a predesignated national delegation; thereafter draft resolutions embodying the recommendations were to be approved.

c. A final series of plenary sessions to endorse the draft resolutions.

Problems arose in the two main commissions, the Political and Economic Commissions. In spite of opposition, subcommittees were formed, within each of which specific draft resolutions were worked out. The subcommittee question appears to have been introduced in both instances by Arab delegates. The argument advanced by those who favored subcommittees was, in the Political Commission, that special attention had to be given to the problems of Palestine and Algeria. In the Economic Commission it was argued that the distinction between the economic problems of the independent nations and those of the still-dependent countries had to be recognized and provided for. Although the Soviet, Chinese, and pro-Communist delegates all appeared to oppose the creation of subcommittees, they adjusted effectively to the situation. In fact the creation of the subcommittees enhanced the influence of individual pro-Communist Arab delegates upon the specific language of the final resolutions, prevented coordinated action by the proponents of such proposals as those advocating the creation of a common bank, a common market, a common development fund, etc., and reduced the effectiveness of potential sources of opposition to the general trend of the Conference. The fact that the Conference resolutions fitted neatly with the Communist programs for action in both the independent countries and the dependent territories is also a reflection of the work of the subcommittees.

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V. THE NON-COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION

Available evidence strongly suggests that other forces besides those under Communist control did in fact make a contribution to the size and apparent impressiveness of the gathering. But it is also clear that none of these forces were capable of preventing Communist control of the gathering or were able to exploit it to serve their own purposes. Three other evident forces were

a. Arab nationalists who support President Nasser's policy of positive neutrality, but at the same time appear to oppose Communist control and manipulation of local movements.

b. Elements, largely centering around Japanese and Indian non-Communist nationalists, whose participation was motivated by their interest in maintaining peace and generating cooperative effort in economic and political development of Africa and Asia.

c. Nationalist forces, particularly in colonial territories of Africa, which sought tangible aid and support for their efforts to win political independence.

The failures of these elements were directly related to the effectiveness with which Communist instrumentalities gained control of key positions, dominated the deliberations, coordinated their activities at the Conference, injected reports, organizational proposals, and well-prepared draft resolutions, and in general successfully applied, at a major international popular gathering, the time-honored and effective techniques that Communist parties in the Free World have employed for thirty years.

But Communist tactics were by no means the only factor. Many participants were disappointed at their failure to accomplish their own ends, but at the same time many of them have publicly demonstrated their satisfaction with the "moderate" nature of many of the Conference resolutions. What criticisms they have made of Communist actions at the Conference dealt mainly with the fact and character of Soviet participation. Some of the more observant have also criticized the absence of substantive discussion and the obviously prearranged procedures by which prefabricated resolutions were

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run through the Conference. In one instance a leading delegate--Kamal Jamblatt of Lebanon--withdrew from his delegation and denounced the Communist seizure of control of the national group, but this unique event was brought on largely by the nature and strength of the Lebanese Communist effort to win control of the delegation.

There is convincing evidence that most of these delegates lacked (and still lack) an appreciation of the Communist objectives at Cairo. Equally important, they appear to lack an appreciation of the role which the CPSU expected the Cairo Conference to play in its general global strategy. There has been no acknowledgement by this element that their mere participation aided Communist exploitation of the Conference. The Japanese delegation alone--the second largest group after that of Egypt--accounted for over 10 per cent of the attendance. Only fifteen of the fifty-eight in the Japanese group subsequently extended their travel to include a visit to the USSR and China, while the remaining forty-three, who can be reasonably assumed to represent the bulk of the non-Bloc oriented element, returned directly to Japan. The failure of the Conference to endorse any substantive proposals for multilateral economic organization has also gone unchallenged by those delegates whose primary motive in attending was to gain acceptance of such proposals. Above all, so far as their immediate interests are concerned, these elements failed to recognize or acknowledge the relationship of the Conference to the actions of their national Communist parties and front groups.

In fact, few of the non-Communist delegates demonstrated any critical interest in the resolutions which did not directly involve their own national interests. There was very little contact and cooperation between non-Communist delegations, although a few individual delegates did seek to establish personal contacts with others who might later prove worthwhile. Sightseeing and organized entertainments in general kept these people occupied outside of the formal sessions of the Conference, while the Communist delegates used the free periods purposefully and to good advantage, consulting with others of their kind on matters relating to the Conference itself and cultivating non-Communists. Scholarship offers, invitations for trips, gift-giving, and flattering interviews by Bloc press representatives were all extended during such periods.

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In spite of the presence of many individuals with parliamentary or legal experience, there was no indication that the glaring weaknesses in the constitution and charter of the secretariat were challenged. Contradictions between the Conference's resolutions and the domestic and foreign policies of the respective governments of the participants were also ignored, except in one or two instances.

In relation to the international front participation, the "honored guests" were officially identified in Conference publicity material only by the countries of their origin, and their identification as leading functionaries of the whole range of international Communist fronts was never brought under open discussion. The absence of observers from the United Nations organizations dealing with non-governmental activity of international significance, who logically should have been extended an invitation by a body which professed its support for the concept and organization of the UN, was nowhere remarked--nor, for that matter, was the absence of delegations from a significant number of Afro-Asian states.

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VI. THE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE

The Communist forces comprised the delegations (and unofficial participants, such as translators and journalists) from the participating countries of the Soviet bloc--the USSR, China, North Korea, Mongolia, Viet Nam. They also included, however, more than ninety members of the delegations from non-Bloc countries. The identified total group susceptible to at least some degreee of Communist control amounted, therefore, to 140, or over 30 per cent. This group was supplemented by an additional twelve Soviet nationals, who, accredited as journalists and translators, participated in the activities of the Conference.

The members of the non-Bloc group, whose reliability and witting devotion to the interests of the International Communist Movement varied widely, included on the one hand a number of fully indoctrinated, dedicated, and competent members and leaders of national Communist parties, and on the other hand a number of individuals who have participated in the past, at the national or international level, in more than one identified Communist front organization. Some of the latter cannot and should not be classed as Communists; but whatever their motives have been, their witting and repeated participation in such activities, in more than one context, and under widely varying circumstances, suggests that in the opinion of the Communist movement at least, they are characterized as "objectively progressive elements" whose cooperation has proved productive in the past. Their participation at Cairo suggests strongly that their cooperation has also been of appreciable current value, and there are no indications to date that any of them have significantly modified their attitude toward such cooperation since the Conference ended.

A. The Non-Bloc Delegates

All the non-Bloc Communist and pro-Communist delegates have been active in front and unity of action programs in the past. Bloc friendship societies, the Peace Movement, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), and bodies for the promotion of Bloc trade were the main areas of their earlier activity. Not all of them played leading roles at the Conference, however. Virtually none of the lawyers' contingent were prominent.

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On the basis of available evidence, it seems likely that Communist-inspired initiatives were taken mainly by about ten persons, distributed more or less evenly among the Egyptian, Syrian, Sudanese, and Japanese delegations. Most of these individuals had been involved in solidarity activity as far back as early 1955. Another four or five, drawn mainly from the Indian and Egyptian delegations, appear to have concerned themselves mainly with organizational and procedural questions--guiding the selection of presiding heads of subcommittees, serving as rapporteurs, guiding discussions, etc. The balance of the group appears simply to have made appropriate speeches and voted properly on procedural points and resolutions.

One of the most interesting facts about the Communist and pro-Communist delegates was that the most significant Communists among them did not engage in any newsworthy activity--or concealed their activity very well. Mustafa Amin of Syria, Fuad Nasser of Jordan, Abd al-Qadr Ismail of Iraq, Romesh Chandra of India, Tokusaburo Dan of Japan, all of whom are at least of Party Central Committee stature, remained completely in the background. Of this group, only A. K. Gopalan of the CP India was named in reports of the Conference. He participated in the Drafting Committee of the subcommittee on Imperialism in the Political Commission.

B. The Bloc Delegates

The Soviet delegation included four persons with records of extensive front activity in the past. Of these, only two--E. M. Zhukov and A. V. Sofronov--played significant roles. Zhukov, who has long been a leading authority on Communist party strategy in the Afro-Asian area, worked closely with Arzumaniyan; and Sofronov participated in the work of the Political Commission and of the Organizational Commission which was composed of the heads of delegations. The head of the Soviet delegation, Sharaf Rashidov, was present at the latter gathering, but Sofronov carried the burden of the activity. Both Rashidov and the much better-known Soviet Moslem front personality Mirza Turzun Zade bore no major responsibility for Conference tactics.

The Chinese delegation, which took virtually no initiatives except in the Cultural Commission, was quite impressive. Most of the group had participated in international front activity in the period since 1950 (the fields of peace, women's activities,

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youth, labor, culture, friendship, journalism, and trade promotion). Of equal if not greater interest is the fact that at least seven of the delegates, in spite of well-documented records of collaboration with the International Communist Movement and the Chinese Communist party going back well before World War II, both in China and abroad, have never publicly acknowledged their membership in the Chinese Communist party. Most of this group in fact were active in Nationalist China up until 1949, when at critical moments they "defected" to the Communist regime. All of them have had long and varied experience in clandestine activity.

The Mongolian and Viet Nam delegations appeared to have merely representational duties; and only one man, Han Sul Ya, in the North Korean delegation was noteworthy for his activities in the Algerian subcommittee.

A leading figure in the Chinese delegation, Burhan Shahidi, of the China Islamic Association, stayed in Cairo for several weeks after the Conference and participated in the creation of a new Chinese-Egyptian Friendship Society. The Soviet delegation also remained for at least two weeks exploiting contacts opened up at the Conference and visiting universities, government offices, the National Science Council, etc.

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VII. THE ISSUES

The two primary interests of the Communist initiators and participants in the Conference were

a. to tie the aspirations and campaigns for national liberation of colonial territories to the Soviet peace campaign;

b. to guide the Afro-Asian preoccupation with national economic development into channels and courses of action which would both complete the breaking of ties with the West and lay the groundwork for eventual integration of Africa and Asia into the economic system of the Soviet bloc.

The relevant issues were dealt with in the Political and Economic Commissions of the Conference.

A. The Peace Strategy

Both the declaration issued by the twelve Communist parties of the Soviet bloc in November 1957 and the Peace Manifesto endorsed at the same time by sixty-four Communist parties state that the "struggle for peace is the foremost task" of these parties--but the Twelve-Party Declaration makes it abundantly clear that the peace campaign is a stratagem, not an objective, when it states that the "tasks confronting the Communist parties of the world necessitate closer unity . . . rallying the working people and progressive mankind, the freedom and peace-loving peoples of the world." The purpose of the strategy emerges promptly in the succeeding text. After portraying Communist parties as "loyal defenders of the national and democratic interests of the peoples of all countries," it is pointed out that in many countries "still confronted with the historic tasks of struggle for national independence the struggle against war is spearheaded against the big monopoly groups of capital as those chiefly responsible" for the threat of war. In independent countries, the declaration states, "objective conditions are being created for uniting under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary parties, broad sections of the population to fight for peace." Here, and in the subsequent discussion of the Communist interest in seeking power by "peaceful" means, the role of unity of action in the peace struggle is clearly shown to be that of facilitating

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the Communist party's gaining of power--and the alternative presented is violent struggle. As the declaration states: "In this case [violent struggle] the degree of bitterness and the form of class struggle will depend . . . on the resistance put up by reactionary circles, on these people using force at one or another stage of the struggle for Socialism."

The Peace Manifesto, on the other hand, is a less fundamental document which is aimed at promoting unity of action in pursuit of short-range objectives--the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons testing and unconditional prohibition of the manufacture and use of these weapons. It is toward these objectives that the peace struggle activity in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was directed, as the Political Commission agenda, deliberations, and resolutions show. The immediate aim was to promote participation by Afro-Asian elements in World Peace Council-sponsored projects such as the Stockholm Congress for Disarmament and Peaceful Coexistence in July 1958 and the Fourth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (August 1958).

B. The Strategy of the Economic Struggle

As far back as February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in discussions concerning the character of the struggle to advance the cause of Communism outside the Soviet bloc, attention was focussed on the importance of the economic area. But in January 1957 in a Kommunist article entitled "The Disintegration of the Colonial System of Imperialism and Questions of International Relations," the Soviet view of this matter was further clarified. Starting from the premise that the winning of political independence is only the first major step toward complete independence, it states:

> ". . . Now that the overwhelming majority of the nations of the East have . . . ended the hateful colonial bondage, new tasks await them.
>
> "Imperialism, colonialism stand as a barrier on the path to accomplishing plans for economic and cultural advancement. . . .
>
> "The disintegration of the colonial system . . . is an entire stage of acute conflicts, numerous battles over all

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questions of economies and politics. . . . At the moment the center of the struggle has moved to the economic sphere. The disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism is entering a new and higher stage."

The article later made the point that although "the domination by finance capital could not have been eliminated in the past by any changes in the sphere of political democracy," the ability of the Soviet bloc to provide powerful economic support to these countries "has fundamentally changed the objective situation of the countries of the East fighting against colonialism." The article makes it clear that this assistance is justified insofar as it aids the extension of state-owned economic enterprise, development programs, and the elimination of foreign capitalist controls, and emphasizes that it supports the already existing trend in the East toward socialism.

The article also comments on the role of Communist parties in these countries. Calling for national unity campaigns on economic issues, it states, "The experience of China shows that development of the countries of the East toward socialism is fully possible within the framework of a coalition of political parties. . . . Peaceful development does not at all preclude, but on the contrary, presupposes class struggle, the struggle of the supporters of social progress against the reactionary and exploiter forces seeking to go back to agreement with imperialism!"

Soviet bloc aid is nowhere described as the main element in this economic struggle or as a substitute for local action. Nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise has long been a policy advocated by such mature Communist parties of the area as those of India and Syria; and as early as the summer of 1956 the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, a small but highly significant Communist front organization, made the propriety of nationalization one of its central themes. In November 1957 the IADL Conference in Moscow claimed credit for having issued a report endorsing nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise prior to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.

It is now clear that this IADL campaign played a part in laying the groundwork for the economic deliberations at Cairo. In May 1957 a conference was organized in Italy by the IADL which dealt

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exclusively with this question, and Syrian and Egyptian representatives participated in the deliberation. Again in early November 1957 the topic was a major theme of the Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Damascus, where its significance had been enhanced by the Indonesian steps to nationalize Dutch-owned enterprise as a part of its campaign for the annexation of West Irian. It is interesting to observe that two of the Egyptian lawyers who played key roles in these activities--Mahmoud el-Hinnawi and Salah Abdel Hafez--went to Moscow to attend the IADL Conference in mid-November 1957 and subsequently were members of the Egyptian delegation to the Cairo Conference. At Moscow too the Egyptian Ali Badawi, an ex-Minister of Justice, was "elected" a vice president of the IADL.

The role of the IADL in the Cairo Conference is further suggested by the statement, made by IADL president D. N. Pritt at Moscow in November 1957, that he had had an opportunity to "strengthen relationships with Indonesian, Indian, and Syrian lawyers" at a meeting held in China in September 1957. Pritt was one of the "guests" at Cairo, and was, therefore, in a position to exploit these "strengthened relationships" both with long-standing colleagues in the World Peace Movement and members of the Lawyers Association, many of whom were key figures in the national delegations.

1. The Role of National Communist Parties

Perhaps the best description of the current Communist program for exploiting the economic issue at the national level in the independent countries of Afro-Asia is that written by Ajoy Ghosh, Secretary General of the CP of India ("For A Mass Party", in New Age, February 1958). Under the subtitle, "Crisis of the Second Plan" (referring to the second Indian Five-Year Plan for economic development), he wrote:

> "Conditions are getting created for the establishment of proletarian hegemony in our national movement. . . . Our Party, while supporting the aims and objectives of the plan, while declaring itself in favor of the emphasis on industrialization and extension of the public sector, laid bare the contradictions between the aims of the plan and the methods by which they were sought to be implemented. . . . But the most menacing feature of the situation is the activity that is being

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> conducted by extreme reactionary circles. . . . They seize upon the difficulties of the plan with a view to pushing their own anti-national policies. . . . The campaign against our foreign policy, the campaign against the progressive features of the second Five-Year Plan, the campaign against the Kashmir Government--all these campaigns are not unrelated. The driving forces behind these campaigns are in the final analysis the same. The imperialists, the landlords, the big anti-national monopolists, and extreme reactionary circles who fear the people and hate democracy. . . . It is the patriotic duty of every Indian, irrespective of the Party to which he belongs, to unite against these forces, to unmask them, to wage a determined battle against the path along which they want to push the country. Our Party has to play a major role in achieving this unity."

A. K. Gopalan, a member of the Politburo of CP India, a delegate to the Cairo Conference, and deputy leader of the Indian Communist Parliamentary bloc, is one of the prime figures in this national campaign, which was intensified in August-September 1957. The relationship between this program, which is reflected in the activities of national Communist parties throughout the Afro-Asian world, and the resolutions of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference is obvious. In the article quoted above the Secretary General of the Indian Party stated that it was "necessary for Party units to move into action in a big and effective way on such big developments as the historical Cairo Conference."

2. The Role of Communist Trade Unions

a. In the Independent Countries

Another major step in the elaboration of this strategy was set forth in October 1957 in the speech delivered at the Fourth Congress of the WFTU in Leipzig by S. A. Dange, another leading Indian Communist and international front figure for many years. Elements of this speech, "Trade Union Tasks in the Fight Against Colonialism", were subsequently accepted at the annual session in late December 1957 as the basis for the current policy of the All-India Trade Union Congress. The speech focussed attention, as did Ghosh's article, on defending the aims of the

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second Five-Year Plan, and on criticizing the methods used to carry it out, but added, necessarily, a further point. "The trade union movement, while cooperating in genuine plans for development that would benefit the people, and allowing legitimate gains to the bourgeoisie, should refuse to give up its claims for a just share of the national income for wage increases, for better working conditions, and democratic rights."

Dange also called for trade unions to participate in the struggle for peace and to agitate for support for the liberation struggle in colonial territories.

b. In the Colonial Territories

But Dange's speech at Leipzig differentiates clearly between the program to be followed in independent countries and that applicable in colonial territories. The following excerpt reveals the plan for work in the colonies:

> "The problem for the colonies as such is markedly different. Naturally for these countries the fundamental task is to achieve national independence. At present many of them are faced with brutal wars and armed repression. Under such circumstances, the economic and social problems of the workers are extremely serious.
>
> "In these countries the big enterprises all belong to foreign monopolies--the greater part of the cultivatable land has been seized by foreign colonialists.
>
> "In many of these countries the colonial authorities carry out so-called economic development plans which are in fact intended to increase profits for the monopolies and to intensify the exploitation of the peoples.
>
> "Their (the workers) single most urgent demand is for the improvement of their hard living conditions. The source of their hardships is in the common scourge--colonialism. Consequently the trade union movement is confronted with the double task of fighting against the direct political rule of the colonialists and in defense of the workers' interests."

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Perhaps the most interesting phrase in this excerpt is S. A. Dange's term "direct political rule"--which cannot be construed as a simple alternative to the terms "right of self-determination" or "independence" which have long been well-established as Communist slogans. The introduction of this term suggests that in some circumstances a mere loosening of the ties between a colony and its controlling power may be the proper tactical policy for a Communist trade union to advocate, rather than calling for immediate and complete independence. This interpretation gains in credibility in view of the recent endorsement by the Communist-infiltrated trade union organization in French West Africa of a plan for a federal union between France and the territories of French Africa.

3. The Strategy Unified at Cairo

The main elements of the strategy were finally and clearly brought together by the speech of the Soviet delegate Arzumaniyan at Cairo. Although he continued to call attention to Soviet willingness to give aid "within the capabilities of the Soviet economy," the main emphasis in his presentation was on the proper methods for carrying out a national economic development program and for financing it in large part through the Soviet techniques used in "building socialism" in the USSR.

The Conference resolutions did not incorporate many of the Arzumaniyan proposals, but they reflected his basic assumptions, endorsed the propriety of nationalization, and provided a basis for Communist agitational and unity programs at the national and regional levels.

The main points of the blueprint for internal economic development presented by the USSR were published almost verbatim by the Communist Party of Tunisia in its newspaper, Al Taliya, on 22 December 1957, before the Conference convened, as the program which it advocated for the nation.

Another anticipation occurred in a commentary on a book, Development in Free Asia, in the October-December 1957 issue of the Asia-Africa Review. Dr. Gyan Chand* in his article focussed

*Dr. Gyan Chand, an erstwhile economic adviser to the Government of India, was a delegate to the Moscow Economic Conference of 1952, deputy leader of a peace delegation to Peiping in 1952, and a leading figure in the creation and activities of the India-China Friendship Association from 1952 on.

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attention on the same problems and tasks of national economic policy that the Soviet delegate's speech subsequently explored. This discussion was introduced with the statement, ". . . . The Asian countries have to face the stark fact that resources for their economic development would have to be made available through their own almost unaided exertions; state trading, nationalization of foreign enterprise, development of state-financed cooperatives, balanced development of industry, etc."

In summary, the general strategy for exploitation of economic issues which emerged during the period of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference appears to involve the following main elements:

In the Independent Countries of Africa and Asia

A. Continuation of Soviet aid, "within limits."

B. Pressure on economic issues by the Communist parties and fronts, especially for the adoption of socialist (i.e., Soviet) techniques for achieving national economic development, including the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise.

C. Exposure and discrediting of national elements which oppose the socialization of the economy, the modification of governmental economic structure along socialist lines, and ever closer identification with the Soviet bloc policies in the foreign trade sphere.

D. Pressure for active governmental support of colonial liberation movements.

In the Colonial Territories

A. Organization of trade union unity on purely economic grounds (wages, etc.).

B. Extension of trade union influence in the national liberation movement, based on opposition to colonial development plans and to foreign ownership of major sectors of the local economy.

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C. Development of a propaganda campaign addressed to nationalist leaders and local businessmen based upon the rosy prospects for future aid and profitable trade--if these territories succeed in freeing themselves from the economic control of the "colonialists".

It was in fact observed that at Cairo the Soviet economic delegation at one point informed a group of the delegates from Black Africa that a billion dollars worth of aid could be made available to them by the Soviet Bloc; the precondition for getting such aid was, of course, obvious. The impact of such "offers" is clearly propagandistic only.

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VIII. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AT THE CONFERENCE

There was extensive participation in Conference delegations of persons long identified with the numerous international Communist fronts (see attachments A and B, which identify such delegates). But, in addition, most of the central organizations of these fronts sent representatives to Cairo as observers. This observer group was composed of key figures from the fronts, who had many contacts among the delegates.

The following list identifies these individuals:

James G. Endicott of Canada	Vice President of the World Peace Council
D. N. Pritt of England	Member of the Bureau of the World Peace Council President, International Association of Democratic Lawyers
Mrs. Jorge Zalamea of Colombia	Secretary of the World Peace Council
Carmen Zanti of Italy	Secretary, Women's International Democratic Federation President of the Youths' Federation
Renato Mieli of Italy	Delegate of the Anti-Colonial People's Conference
Cheng Chi Ming of China	Secretary of the International Union of Students
Saadati Babak of Iran	Secretary, Colonial Bureau of the International Union of Students
Bruno Bernini of Italy	President of the World Federation of Democratic Youth
S. Majumdar of India	Secretary of the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

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Near the end of the Conference Kamal al-Din Bindari, ex-Egyptian Ambassador to the USSR and chairman of the Egyptian Peace Committee, gave a reception which was attended by active participants in the Peace Movement. According to Tass (3 January 1958) persons attended from the delegations of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, USSR, India, Cameroons, Zanzibar, Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and Chad. D. N. Pritt, Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru, M. I. Kotov, George Hanna (Lebanon), and Dr. Felix Moumie were singled out for special mention among the guests. This gathering is particularly noteworthy because for some time the Egyptian Peace Partisans have been maintaining pressure on the Egyptian Government in order to win official recognition. Prior to this reception, however, they had had little visible success. The organization in fact remains without official governmental recognition, although the activities of its leading figures are not significantly hampered.

Little is known of the activities of these observers, but Mr. Babak, secretary of the Colonial Bureau of the IUS, circulated extensively among students in the various delegations. Mr. Renato Meili, who represented the Anti-Colonial People's Conference which convened in Athens in late October 1957, presented a message from the president of the Greek Anti-Colonial League, Mr. Nikos Pouliopoulos, the character of which is clearly reflected in the following extract.

> "And in this sense, I am sure that the Congress will not only condemn slavery, terror, and the tortures of British colonialism against liberation fighters, but that they will legitimize armed struggle for liberation...."

This organization, in which a number of West European Left Socialists are active, has never endorsed Soviet actions. But the Yugoslav Communist-controlled Socialist Alliance participated in the October 1957 gathering, together with a number of other proponents of unity of action between Communists and Socialists. Mr. Mieli himself is a member of the Communist party of Italy and in the past has served on the editorial staff of the party's newspaper, L'Unita.

Since the close of the Conference virtually all the international Communist fronts have given international publicity and approval to its resolutions, declared their intention of supporting

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and aiding its programs and initiatives, and welcomed its support of their activities. In fact, the bulk of the publicity given to the Conference since the end of January 1958 has emanated from the international fronts and their national affiliates.

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IX. COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS

In spite of the participation of impressive delegations from five of the countries of the Soviet Bloc, the main Communist initiatives at the Conference were taken by Syrian, Egyptian, Indian, and Japanese representatives with Communist and pro-Communist records, whose proposals received endorsement and support from the Soviet Bloc delegates. Only the Arzumaniyan speech and the invitation to the Writers' Conference in Tashkent in October 1958 can be construed as major initiatives by Soviet Bloc delegates. Specific condemnations of colonialism, regional pacts, racial discrimination, and unfair economic practice proposed by other non-Soviet delegations to the Conference were endorsed and supplemented by general expressions of Afro-Asian support for national liberation movements and for the territorial claims of independent Afro-Asian countries. But the truly significant resolutions of the Conference, from the Communist point of view, were those which

a. endorsed activities of the international front organizations (the World Peace Council's Congress of Peoples for Disarmament, the Fourth World Conference Against Atom and Hydrogen Bombs, August 1958);

b. embodied proposals for future organization and action; and

c. dealt with economic questions.

X. FUTURE ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY THE SOLIDARITY COUNCIL

The following activities were called for in the resolutions endorsed at the Conference

A. Economic study organizations

1. An Afro-Asian Economic Committee--to pool data and facilitate economic relations between independent countries of Africa and Asia.

2. A committee within the Cairo Secretariat, to study the economic problems of dependent countries.

B. Mass organization conferences

1. A joint cooperative and trade union conference.

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2. Youth organization conference.

3. Student organization conference.

4. Women's organizations conference.

Note: In the case of the women's group, the creation of an Afro-Asian Feminists' Union is envisioned. In other instances proposals for the creation of Afro-Asian bodies already are circulating.

C. Trade Organizations

1. A Chambers of Commerce Conference (announced for Cairo, December 1958).

D. Cultural Bodies and Conferences

1. A Committee on Cultural Exchanges (within the Cairo Secretariat Bureau).

2. National bodies to support cultural exchanges.

3. Writers' Conference - Tashkent, October 1958 (endorsed).

4. An Afro-Asian Artists' Conference.

E. Education, Research, and Investigative Bodies

1. An Afro-Asian university.

2. An Afro-Asian historians group.

3. An Afro-Asian educators group.

F. Other Professional Bodies

(Lawyers, doctors, scientists, etc.)

The very number of bodies and gatherings called for may suggest that these projects were merely gestures; but a glance at the composition of the main Communist-controlled and influenced delegations

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suffices to demonstrate that the nucleus of a competent Communist fraction existed for virtually every endeavor named. Further, the honored guests of the Conference included key representatives of all the major international fronts except the World Federation of Trade Unions. Only the Chinese affiliate of the WFTU was represented, in the person of Tung Hsin.

These individuals in a number of instances already have specific projects, sponsoring groups, and tentative dates toward which to work, in which further Egyptian or Afro-Asian initiative is not required. For example

1. The Soviet offer to held the Second Asian Writers' Conference in Tashkent in October 1958 was endorsed at the Asian Writers' Conference in New Delhi, December 1956. Modified to include African participation, it is now being sponsored by the Union of Soviet Writers, in which A. Sofronov of the Soviet delegation to Cairo is a key figure. The Progressive Writers' Association in India, dominated by the CP India, and parallel organizations in Japan and other Afro-Asian countries are equipped to cooperate in the campaign, using the Solidarity Committees as a vehicle. A preparatory committee is to be established in Tashkent in August; until then preliminary work is being carried on by a small group which convened in Moscow, 2-4 June 1958.

2. The Second Afro-Asian Student Conference was scheduled to be held in Japan in the summer of 1958, under joint sponsorship of the Communist-infiltrated Japanese National Federation of Students Self-Government Associations and the All-China Students Federation. However, it has now been announced that a youth and student conference is to be held in Cairo in February 1959. A preparatory committee is to be set up in Cairo in late 1958.

3. The Women's International Democratic Federation has convened its first congress since June 1953 and has included support for the main themes and results of the Cairo Conference in its program. This meeting was held in Vienna in June 1958.

4. Other Afro-Asian gatherings (such as the Afro-Asian Women's Conference which was held in Ceylon in February 1958) are tentatively scheduled. They provide, like the first

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Asian Writer's Conference held in India in December 1956, a target for Communist attempts to infiltrate and dominate the proceedings. Even where such meetings successfully resist Communist attempts to dominate them, the inclusion of Soviet bloc delegations permits them to be exploited effectively as opportunities for cultivating new acquaintances and contacts who may subsequently be willing to abandon opposition to Communist desires and designs.

5. Other regional gatherings, such as the African Popular Conference scheduled for October 1958 in Accra, a newly-projected Arab Popular Conference planned for September 1958, the Festival of African Youth scheduled to be held in Bamako, French West Africa, in September 1958, and many other less inclusive meetings are also exploitable in the development of the Communist version of Afro-Asian solidarity.

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XI. COMMUNIST GAINS FROM THE CONFERENCE--A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

Although the extent to which the permanent organization created at Cairo will serve Communist ends remains unclear, the Conference itself appears to have rendered the following services to current Communist objectives:

a. It endorsed the claim of the USSR to acceptance as an Afro-Asian state, entitled to participate on a basis of equality with other states of the area.

b. It provided in its resolutions a formal identification of the main enemy, a statement of aspirations, and proposals for future action which, while ostensibly enjoying widespread popular Afro-Asian support, in fact constitute a well-tailored framework within which Communist parties and international front affiliates of the area (particularly in the independent countries) can carry on the programs and national unity strategies to which they are already committed.

c. It provided the Communist parties of the Soviet bloc countries with extensive propaganda ammunition which can be and has been used in a deceptive manner to convince their own nations of the successes achieved through current Bloc foreign policy, the extent of popular support and endorsement which Communism enjoys in the Free World, and the weak and disorganized state of the opposition to the further growth of Communism.

d. It provided a basis upon which the Communist parties and peace movements of the principal Western states can mount pressure campaigns against the unity and determination of democratically constituted Western governments.

e. It further complicated, by encouraging intransigence, the orderly, equitable, and peaceful solution of problems existing between Western states and the peoples of the Afro-Asian area.

f. It interposed new problems which tend to inhibit and complicate the working out, by the independent countries

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of the area, of valid and effective forms of cooperation and mutual support which are consistent with both national interests and the peace and stability of the world community.

g. It recorded Afro-Asian support for major programs being developed by the traditional international Communist front organizations.

h. It provided an organizational framework for future solidarity activity, which, because of its form and character, is particularly susceptible to subversion and eventual domination by the International Communist Movement.

The Soviet Union itself has openly acknowledged a number of the points set forth above as accomplishments of the Conference. In Izvestia of 3 January 1958 an article filed from Cairo by S. Kondrashov and V. Kudryavtsev stated that the important results of the Conference were

a. Its "determination of the common enemy."

b. Its concrete statement of the tasks of the peoples in relation to individual countries.

c. Its recognition that the economic problems of the already independent countries are of even greater importance than those of the countries struggling for liberation.

d. Its highlighting of the importance of nationalization and agrarian reform as stimuli for national economic development.

e. Its treatment of issues "in the spirit of the struggle for peace."

f. Its acceptance of Soviet participation.

Soviet bloc news treatment of the Conference addressed to Western Europe and the Americas particularly emphasized the link between anti-colonialism and the peace campaign:

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"The speeches of the delegates clearly showed that the question of national independence of the Afro-Asian peoples is indissolubly linked with the fate of world peace." (K. Zakharov commentary--in German-European Service, 3 January)

"The enormous service rendered by the Cairo Conference, Pravda emphasizes, is the fact that it rallied the people of Africa and Asia under the banner (of peaceful coexistence). It is precisely for this reason that the results of the Conference have been welcomed by all peace-loving nations both in the East and in the West." (Russian Hellschreiber to Europe--3 January)

"Counteracting the Cairo Conference means opposing peace. Don't Americans want peace?" (Moscow-English to North America, 4 January)

This central thesis of the current Communist "peace" campaign is certain to be extensively developed in the months ahead, with an ever-increasing emphasis being put on the idea that those--whether Afro-Asian, European, or American--who refuse to accept the Cairo programs do not want peace.

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XII. THE PROSPECTS

Over eight months have elapsed since the Cairo Conference was held; and in spite of the burst of energy originally expended, the organization created there has done virtually nothing. The majority of the secretariat members have not been designated, and the Egyptian committee continues to carry out what activity is being undertaken. Even at the organizing level there is little evidence that Free World national affiliates are particularly active or that international liaison is well-developed. The USSR is clearly still interested in exploiting Afro-Asian solidarity, but what Bloc activity has been noted is centered largely in the European states, which did not in fact participate at Cairo. East Germany and Rumania have both organized Afro-Asian Friendship bodies. In April, the racial discrimination theme of the Conference was given an anti-American orientation in East and West Europe (as well as India) through the organization of Paul Robeson Birthday Committees. At least one Bloc committee is known to have sought to stimulate a parallel effort in Black Africa.

Cautious but persistent efforts are being made to induce Afro-Asian governments to endorse the Cairo Conference; where these efforts are resisted, an attempt is made to create the impression that such endorsement has been given.

In mid-April, in connection with the Pan-African Accra Conference, a number of the international fronts (and the USSR itself) revived their laudatory treatment of Cairo and linked it to the Accra gathering of African states. Further, significant mentions of Cairo were contained in the speech delivered by Nikita Khrushchev at a dinner of welcome for President Nasser of Egypt in mid-May 1958 and in the final communique of the visit. In describing the common views and shared aims of Egypt and the USSR, Khrushchev stated: "The USSR has endorsed the resolutions of the Cairo Conference." This the Government of Egypt had not as yet officially done.

In the final joint communique, in the section describing the identity of the views of Egypt and the USSR, it was recorded that both governments "support the principles of Bandung which have been reaffirmed by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference

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held in Cairo in 1957, which expressed the hopes and aspirations of these two continents." For a Communist propagandist, this statement can easily be manipulated to convey the idea that the Cairo resolutions were endorsed, rather than the Bandung principles, to which the Cairo resolutions in fact pose serious challenges.

However, the chances for successful exploitation of a regional organization have been substantially reduced during the past months by three developments of major concern to the International Communist Movement. First, the sharp Soviet bloc criticism and the Chinese Communist denunciations of Yugoslavia and its Communist party have created serious strains with the Afro-Asian groups heretofore most willing to engage in joint activity with the Soviet bloc, and have disabused many who considered Chinese Communism significantly different from--and less aggressive than--that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Second, the abrupt Chinese suspension of efforts to develop trade with Japan and its subsequent vigorous denunciation of the Japanese Government represent a fundamental reversal of policy which will tend to cripple the original Afro-Asian solidarity concept as applied in Japan. Third, the hardening policy of the Communist Party of India on domestic issues and the unenthusiastic, stubborn response of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon to the creation of the United Arab Republic have created new national tensions which compromise the "solidarity" approach and reveal, all too clearly, the objectives of the Soviet Union.

It may prove, within the next few months, that the Solidarity Council and Secretariat cannot enlist active participants from the independent Afro-Asian states who are not subject to international Communist discipline. They may, however, continue to exist and operate, either as Soviet/Communist-Arab instruments or at a minimum as an essentially Egyptian-operated facade. In the latter event, the next annual meeting of the Council may prove of great importance.

The Conference resolutions and the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity will probably continue to be exploited as far as possible by the traditional international fronts as bases for continued unity efforts. Only well-publicized failures to gain such support or open repudiations of these efforts by leading figures identified with the Conference are likely to thwart this effort.

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National Communist parties and key Communists of the area are certain to expend considerable effort in attempts to put into effect on the national scene the ideas expressed by the main Communist spokesmen at Cairo. As long as their ideas remain unrepudiated by responsible Afro-Asian leaders and governments, the Communists will be able to exploit the Cairo Conference in order to conceal the true origin of the ideas, to exploit the fiction that they represent the Afro-Asian "wave of the future" in their appeals to the uncommitted, and to press attacks upon their most important local enemies.

Only a major and spectacular shift of Soviet bloc policies toward the Afro-Asian area, a new crisis in the area, or an abrupt change in the attitude of the independent governments of Africa and Asia is likely to invalidate the prospects outlined above.

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